The Serrano Equalization Principle: Its Impact on City Planning, Land Values and Use by Hagman, Donald G.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
California Agencies California Documents
1972
The Serrano Equalization Principle: Its Impact on
City Planning, Land Values and Use
Donald G. Hagman
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_agencies
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
This Cal State Document is brought to you for free and open access by the California Documents at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in California Agencies by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation





I I I I s 
THE SERRANO EQUALIZATION PRINCIPLE: 
ITS IMPACT ON CITY PLANNING, 
LA..TiTD VALUES AND USE 
Donald G. Hagman 
MR-177 
~ Institute of Government and Public Affairs, UCLA, 1972 
THE SERRANO EQUALIZATION PRINCIPLE: ITS IMPACT ON 
CITY PLANNING$ LAND VALUES Aim USE 
* Donald G. Hagman 
I. The Serrano Principle 
On August 30, 1971, in Serrano v. Priest>1 the California Supreme 
Court held the California school finance system violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. Public schools in California, as in many states, are sub-
stantially financed by a local property tax. But the ratio of the 
property tax base to the number of pupils within various school dis-
tricts of the state is not the same. As a result, some school districts 
are able to spend large sums of money per pupil though tax rates are 
very low. Other school districts, despite high tax rat-:;s, are able to 
spend relatively little per pupil. The Serrano principle 11 [p]lainly 
put • • • is that the level of spending . . . may not be a function of 
wealth other than the ivealth of the state as a whole."2 
Made bold by the California decision, courts throughout the country 
began applying the Serrano principle. The Minnesota school finance 
system was held invalid on October 12,3 Wyoming's on December 14,4 
Texas' on December 23. 5 The judicial juggernaut opened the Ne-vr Year by 
* Professor of Law and Acting Director, Institute of Government and 
Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles. Professor Hagman's 
most recent book is Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law, West 
Publishing Co • , 1971 • 
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invalidating school finance systems in Arizona on January 136 and in 
New Jersey on January 19. 7 But the next day, a New· York court refused 
to hold that state 1 s system of school finance to be unconstitutional. 
8 
The New York system does not differ essentially from that in the other 
states. The New York ,iudge merely disagreed that any such system was 
unconstitutional. 
One wonders about the state of mind of the trial juqge in New York, 
sitting in "1-lestchester County, by repute a 11 silk-stock:i,.ng". residential 
suburban area of Ne-vr York City. One would expect that expenditures per 
pupil were relatively high and the tax burdens relatively low in West-
chester. Was the judge's attitude in part shaped by those of the consti-
tuents who elect him? Did the judge realize that his decision was neces-
sary to reverse a principle that if unleashed might be the beginning of 
the end of the Westchester way of life? Perhaps so, for the Serrano 
principle carries redistribution of wealth seeds of destructiveness to 
Westchester-like ways of life. 
We will soon know whether the New York judge, who calls .the Serrano 
thesis the 11one scholar, one dollar" principle, rightly concluded that 
similar U. S. Supreme Court cases9 are precedent for upholding the 
validity of school finance systems. An appeal from the Texas decision 
was filed with the Court on April 17, 1972.10 
II. Acceptance of the Principle 
For the Serrano principle to truly have impact on the nation, the 
U. S. Supreme Court must uphold it, and the Court has not noticeably 
sided with social change in recent years. But the principle is not 
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dead even if the Court concludes Serrano is incorrectly decided. States 
have their own constitutions, and present financing schemes might vio-
late state constitutions, as held in the California, New Jersey and 
Texas decisions. 
Moreover, by the time the U. S. Supreme Court decides the question, 
the principle might be rampant in the nation in any event--not neces-
sarily because it is constitutionally required, but because it is right. 
. 11 
The inequality in school finance has long been regarded as scandalous; 
declaring it unconstitutional merely provides the stimulus for state 
legislatures to break through the status quo. Thus, the California 
legislature has several Serrano-responsive proposals before it, though 
12 technically it need not yet respond. The Minnesota legislature has 
already acted.13 In its massive study on school finance in New York, 
the Fleischmann Commission, reporting after both the Serrano and the 
New York case, made recommendations consistent with the Serrano 
principle.14 The President's Commission on School Finance has made 
recomme~dations supporting the Serrano principle.15 The President's 
proposed $2.5 billion Educational Opportunities Act of 1972 evidences a 
view coincident with Serrano. 16 In light of its previous pronouncements 
on the matter,17 it is a virtual certainty that when the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations18 reports to the President on school 
finance, its recommendations will applaud Serrano principles. 
And one does not avoid the thrust of the Serrano principle by 
substituting other local taxes. While Serrano-like cases deal only 
with property taxes, that is because local taxes for schools have invari-
. . ~ 
ably been property taxes. If a local sales tax or a local income tax 
was used to finance schools, these would likely also be reflective of 
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the wealth of the area and be violative of the Serrano principle. 
It is therefore highly probable that regardless of what the U. S. 
Supreme Court does, the Ser~ principle will be widely applied to 
school financing in America, and shifting to other taxes reflective of 
local wealth will not satisfy the principle. 
III. Possible Extensions of the Principle 
The impact on city planning and property values and uses shortly 
to be described will be more massive if the Serrano principle is extended 
in two possible directions. The two extensions would produce widespread 
and massive social change not often precedented in America. 
Judicial decisions that the quality of all local government services 
must be unchained from the local wealth base is one possible extension. 
That possibility will be a major topic of discussion at the annual meet-
ing of the Local Government Section of the American Bar Association in 
August, 1972. Meanwhile, it appears that the first lawsuit attempting 
to extend Serrano to other local government entities was filed in 
California. The trial judge has overruled defendant's demurrer in the 
lawsuit20 and the matter will now go on to trial. Extension of the 
Serrano principle to all local governments would have more massive 
impact on American planning, land values and uses for several reasons: 
1. Revenues and expenditures of local governments in America other 
than school districts are one and one-half times those of school 
d . t . t 21 1s r1c s. 
2. More than property taxes are involved because local governments 
other than school districts have substantial alternative revenues. 22 
3. The inequalities in revenues and services among local govern-
ments other than school districts &re far more pronounced than among 
school districts. 23 
4. Local governments other than school districts control the urban 
planning system which is frequently responsive to fiscal pressures. 
The second possible extension of Serrano is to measure equality 
not by equal expenditures, but by need. Obviously, in order to maintain 
a certain standard of governmental service, educational or otherwise, 
expenditures must be greater in some areas than others because costs are 
higher. But Serrano does not address itself to needs. That argument was 
rejected in another case where plaintiffs alleged. "only a financing 
system which apportions public funds according to the educational needs 
of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment."24 A major reason 
for rejecting the argument was that needs are very difficult to measure. 
If the court could be shown a -vray to measure needs, perhaps the result 
would be different. 
And a little judicial recognition of the needs ar~~ent would go 
a long way to stimulate a breakthrough to better equalization measured 
by need because that too is regarded as right25 even though we have 
not yet come to recognize such inequalities as unconstitutional. State 
equalization aid to schools has always recognized need and the responses 
to Serrano will invariably go beyond strict equality of burden and 
expenditures and recognize need. In England, which is already some 
hundred years ahead of America in equalization of all local government 
revenues and expenditures, the Conservative government has proposed to 
distribute grants "in such a way that the cost for each local authority 
of providing a standard level of'service [measured by need] should be a 
,26 
standard amount per head. · · 
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IV. Impact of the Principle 
There follow some speculations as to the impacts of the Serrano 
principle. That the impacts will be as alleged is based on conventional 
wisdom and hunch rather than on empirical research. For purposes of 
the speculation, assume that the Serrano principle is extended to the 
possibilities previously outlined. To the extent it is not extended, 
many of the impacts will still occur, but the effect will not be as 
extensive. 
The price of real estate on the "right side of the tracks" •·rill 
decrease in value, while it will increase on the "wrong side of the 
tracks. 11 Consider Weal thyville and Poorville, two aptly named hypo-
thetical cities in a metropolitan area. vJealthyville is a typical high-
quality public services, low tax burden community; Poorville is the 
converse. Real estate values in both cities are in part determined by 
the quality of public services received and the burden of property 
taxes. Therefore, prior to application of Serrano principles, market 
prices for homes in Wealthyville were higher than they were in Poorville, 
where services were poor and property tax burdens were high. 
Post Serrano~ however~ services must be of equal quality and bur-
dens must be equalized among the t1vo cities. If the expenditures and 
burdens are merely redistributed without any change in the amount of 
expenditures and burdens, suburban Wealthyville will receive poorer 
services at higher cost, so market values will drop. Poorville, con-
versely, will receive better services at lower cost, so property values 
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will increase. 
It may be, of course, that the people in Wealthyville will not 
accept lower quality services. One alternative is to purchase services 
from the private sector. But such additional payments, just as an 
increase in property tax burdens, would tend to lower values of property 
in Wealthyville. 27 
Greater socio-economic housing integration will result. There is 
presently considerable wealth and race segregation in housing in most 
areas of America. If one is both poor and of a minority race~ it is 
likely that he lives in a neighborhood limited to others who are poor 
and members of a minority race. But Americans move frequently for a 
variety of purposes, and post Serrano greater socio-economic integration 
could occur. To return to our Wealthyville and Poorville examples, 
post Serrano the people in Poorville should be able to acquire homes in 
Wealthyville at a lesser price with no greater tax burden than in Poor-
ville. Some might choose to do so. Conversely, people in Wealthyville 
may find that with the higher level of services and lower tax burdens 
than previously in Poorville, Poorville has become an acceptable place to 
live. Ultimately, such housing integration is a far more cost-effective 
answer to educational integration than massive busing. 
Low-income housing will be more readily accepted. Cities now use 
every technique that can be devised by man to exclude low-income housing. 28 
Often the exclusion is racially motivated. On the other hand, it is 
also municipal madness to willingly accept low-income housing when, as 
is so, it adds yery little to the tax base and requires very high service 
costs. To do a good job at providing low-income housing now invites 
inundation by the poor from the region. Not only is low-income housing 
-8-
excluded, but through urban renewal, freeway building progr~~s and the 
like, low-income housing is removed, often with no replacement housing 
being fUrnished. Post Serrano, there will be little fiscal pressure to 
exclude or remove low-income housing. 29 The state must adjust its sys-
tem so that the low-income housing can be provided. with quality services 
without imposing such high tax burdens on the community accepting the 
housing. 
More new hous~ng starts in central cities. There are, of course, 
many reasons for the phenomenon that much land in central cities and 
older urban communities lies passed-over, underutilized and vacant 
while land on the suburban fringes is developed with new housing. Per-
haps the Serrano principle will help reverse that phenomenon. Every-
thing else being equal, investors in housing will invest where property 
tax rates are lower. 30 And property tax rates are generally higher in 
the central cities. 31 
Business and industry will not as readily leave the central cities. 
In many metropolitan areas, business and industry is relocating in the 
suburbs. In thirty-nine major metropolitan areas of the country, 85 per-
cent of all industrial and commercial growth, measured by jobs, has taken 
place in the suburbs. In New Jersey the rate has been 95 percent. 32 
There are a number of reasons for such moves, but tax burdens are a 
factor. 33 In New Jersey, for example, tax rates for schools in five 
central cities were $2.57 to $3.69. In nine suburban cities the rates 
varied from $1.16 to $2.05. 34 If tax burdens are equalized, business 
and industry will have one less reason for moving--two less reasons 
when services provided in the central cities are also improved because 
of greater fiscal ability to provide services. 
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Central cities will resume population growth. Central cities are 
declining in population relative to the population of the suburbs. 35 
The reasons for this increasing imbalance are many. 36 But among the 
reasons offered is the desire to obtain higher quality public services 
of a desired sort with lower tax burdens. 37 Suburbs are frequently able 
to provide such advantages. If the Serrano principle is applied, how-
ever, the quality of pu~lic services cannot be dependent on local 
wealth. If such a principle means that a given tax effort must produce 
sufficient revenues to permit equal expenditures per capita, then 
suburbs may still retain the capacity to provide a comparatively favorable 
environment in some metropolitan areas, for to produce an environment 
of suburban quality in central cities might take more than equal 
expenditures per capita vis-a-vis suburbia. The suburban growth might 
well continue if the only advantage suburbia loses is that of the lower 
tax burden. However, if the test for equality of services comes to be 
measured by need rather than by equality in expenditures per capita, 
the overall quality of life in the central cities should be equal to that 
in suburbia, insofar as local public services can produce it. Suburbia 
will therefore lose some of its relative advantages and central cities 
should show greater growth than now relative to suburban gro~~h. 
Overzoning will be reduced. While tax exemptions to industrial 
developers are confined to limited areas of the country,38 it is no 
secret that many municipalities compete in a variety of legal, marginally 
legal and illegal ways to .attract tax base, e.g., through industrial 
development. That same motive, when added to typical landowner pressure 
to have land zoned for the most intensive land use possible, leads to a 
common defect of zoning ordinances: 
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3. Excessive areas or frontages are zoned for the more 
intensive uses ... in relation either to: (1) the 
effective demand for such space, or to (2) the capacity 
of the streets and utility systems available to serve 
such districts, 39 
Of course, if the gross overzoning of land for intensive industrial or 
commercial use does not provide a prospective developer with every 
imaginable option for location within an area, the city is often more 
than eager to rezone wherever desired, thus disrupting its planning. 
Overzoning creates a situation where the zoning and the demand for land 
as zoned are not reasonably related to one another. As a result, land 
may be unutilized or underutilized as it is unduly held off the market. 
Intensively zoned land may become lower priced, encouraging disruption 
by less intensive uses. Generally, overzoning makes it less possible 
for planning to shape development. 
Post Serrano, hmvever, the need to encourage development of indus-
trial and co:rr,mercial areas to provide tax base ;;dll not be as great. 
Consequently, to the extent overzoning is caused by the need to attract 
tax base, the pressures for overzoning can be reduced. 
Local government revenue demands and expenditures will decrease. 
Local government expenditures have been an increasing share of Gross 
National Product. In 1969, local government expenditures were 5.96 
percent of GNP while in 1950 they were 4.38 percent. 40 Post Serrano, 
it will be more costly to use local government to preserve islands of 
privilege. And the Serrano principle can partially be avoided if, for 
example, the people in Wealthyville purchase more government-like 
services from the private sector. Thus, as has been the case where 
schools were racially integrated or the level of services rendered by 
public schools was lowered, many affluent parents send their children 
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to private schools. Such practices dilute the underlying social 
change intended by Serrano, namely, that the quality of schooling 
should not so much depend on 1-real th. Horeover, those persons who pur-
chase their services privately tend to become a constituency against 
rather than for high-quality public services, so that their tax plus 
private service purchase burdens can be reduced. 
Annexations and exclusions need not be tax motivated. In an ideal 
system, political boundary lines of local governments might be set to 
conform to socio-economic geography. But under the system practiced in 
most American states, municipal growth b~ annexation or non-growth by 
refusal to annex, is often motivated by considerations of tax and 
services burden. As a Texas report points out: 
No.doubt one of the major causes of annexation activity and, 
unfortunately of annexation abuse, is intercity competition. 
It would seem that municipal competition has forced cities 
to grab huge blocks of land to protect their industries, 
assure future tax revenues •.•• 41 
As a result of' the intercity competition, areas are annexed solely 
because they contain a facility providing large tax base, such as a 
major industrial plant. But it might make much better sense for the 
plant to be in another local government. Often, in order to annex, it 
is not possible to annex only the tax base, but intervening territory 
best left outside the limits of' the annexing local government must also 
be annexed to meet typical contiguity requirements. Thus, lands not 
appropriately included might be added or boundary lines might be erratic 
and gerrymandered. Both situations may make it difficult and more 




On the other hand, areas definitely urban and residential and 
needing the kind of services which could be provided by annexation are 
l,".:l 
often denied annexation or even excluded4~ because of high service 
costs. For example, no city is eager to annex a low-income housing 
project. 
Post Serrano, much of the tax-service burden need either to annex, 
to deny annexation or to exclude will be removed. Political 'and plan-
ning considerations more than fiscal considerations can determine 
what areas should be within what local governments. 
Fiscal inducements to governmental fragmentation by incorporation 
of cities wili be reduced. Cities are incorporated for a variety of 
reasons, but many have been incorporated for fiscal reasons, to provide 
tax havens variously for residence, industry, commerce and agriculture. 
For example, by minimizing the amount of residential property in the 
city, property taxes on business ventures can be kept relatively low. 
Because of sales tax laws, as in California and Illinois, which provide 
for a local tax or a state tax returned to the local government within 
which the sale took place, some cities are incorporated that specialize 
in retail businesses. Such cities finance themselves not on their ovrn 
wealth but on the wealth of persons living in other cities--perhaps a 
double violation of the Serrano principle. In states such as Wisconsin, 
where a portion of the individual income tax is returned to the local 
government wherein the taxpayer resides, cities of residential elitism 
have been formed. By using land use practices vhich permit only the 
wealthy elite to live there, the return from the income tax may be 
sufficient to eliminate any city property tax, and the quality of public 
services can still be high. 
-13-
Because of such fiscally motivated incorporations, other local 
governments in the same socio-economic region, with barely minimal 
services and desperate for tax base, have skyrocketing tax burdens because 
the wealth of the region has been captured by these kinds of near-private 
purpose uses of public government. Post Serrano, when burdens and 
services must be more equalized, the reason for such havens will cease 
to exist. The fiscal inducement for the incorporation of further such 
local governments will be removed. 
Reduction in local government. fra~entation. Coherent planning is 
a virtual impossibility in socio-economic regions that are split geo-
graphically and functionally by many governmental entities. Special 
districts are numeric~lly the most rapidly increasing form of local 
government in America; 44and they are a double anathema, for they cause 
both functional and geographical frar~entation at the same time. Most 
studies of special districts have concluded that they are marginally 
desirable and that general-purpose local governments are preferable in 
all but rare instances. 45 
Yet special districts must often be formed because general-purpose 
governments are financially unable to provide required services because 
they have reached their tax or debt limits. ~fuile such limits might be 
rationally set considering all local governments as a whole, there is 
an uneven spread of tax base and uneven demand for services among differ-
ent localities in the state. 
By forming new local governments, debt and tax limits imposed on 
local government already existing in the area are generally avoided. 46 
The new local governments can then provide the needed services. But 
burdens .are not reduced, they are merely imposed by a different type of 
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local government. And the local government utilized, typically a 
special district, is not the sort needed. In high-service-demand areas 
with high population densities and likely a nuJnber of local government 
entities already operative, an entity is needed that has a vride range of 
powers, managed in a way which can apply resources on a priority basis 
and coordinate problem solving. Special districts, on the other hand, 
"do their oWn thing11 vTi thout regard to overall needs. Thus, the people 
in the area pay too much to receive services that do not meet their 
priority needs. 
While Serrano does nothing directly about tax limits and debt 
limits, Serrano found tax rates constitutionally invalid because the 
higher rates meant greater burdens without a commensurate increase in 
services. Since most tax limits are expressed in terms of rates per 
assessed valuation,47 an averaging-out of rates should give general-
purpose governments more breathing room between their tax rates and 
their tax limits, thus removing one reasori for fragmenting an area into 
special districts. 
Regionalism and regional cooperation will be promoted. 
[A consequence of fiscal fragmentation] is the'incentive which 
each local government has to take actions to improve its mm 
tax base at the expense of its neighbors. Fiscal fragmenta-
tion has the effect of discouraging intergovernmental coopera-
tion in the Twin Cities area. This in turn results in actions 
which work against the benefit of the entire area. 48 
So reads the introduction to the Report which led.to the innovative tax-
sharing plan now in effect in the Twin Cities metropolitan area in 
Minnesota. 49 Under the plan, new tax base in one governmental area is 
shared as part of the tax base of the region. The point made in the 
Report and made frequently elsewhere50 is that regional planning and 
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regional cooperation in America is a virtual impossibility when dis-
parities in fiscal capacity make each local government compete vigor-
ously and of necessity to preserve its own tax base. Despite anti-
trust laws, it sometimes appears there is more cooperation between 
General Hotors and Ford than there is beh1een units of local government 
•ri thin metropolitan regions. 
The Serrano principle, on the other hand, operates to make the 
entire state a fiscal region, thus making it possible for considerations 
of socio-economic geography rather than fiscal considerations to govern 
regional planning and cooperation. The very definition of a region is 
an area with an essentially unitary socio-economic geography. Once 
fiscal considerations are removed, local political units are free to 
act in a way which fosters natural socio-economic geography. Unfortu-
nately, the Serrano principle is not judicially applied to require an 
equalization of burdens and expenditures betvreen the parts of regions 
lying in more than one state. 51 And perhaps it would be better if the 
burdens and expenditures were equalized within regions rather than 
within states. 5·2 But in implementing the Serrano principle, the federal 
and state legislatures can make equalization adjustments that go beyond 
constitutional and judge-ordered requirements. On the whole, the 
Serrano principle is a massive step forward in the direction of eliminat-
ing excessive localism. 
Decentralization will be financially feasible. 
Black student: "We would like to incorporate Watts as a sepa-
rate city." 
Hagman: 11Where tvill you get the money to provide city services? 11 
Black student : "We '11 get it from our brothers in Bald·win 
Hills." 53 
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Such a conversation was the stimulus for an article54 outlining 
a fiscally feasible way of permitting decentralization of government. 
Decentralization is not the same as fragmentation. The former is done 
rationally, the latter just happens. But decentralization is not feasible 
for poor, minority populations when any governmental entity formed has 
relatively little tax base and, likely, relatively high service demands. 
Thus, whatever is good about such concepts as home rule, neighborhood 
government, local control, self-determination and the like, which have 
produced suburban America, has been denied to large segments of the 
population who frequently live in large cities, represented by govern-
ments run by other than their kind. 
Post Serrano such persons could also enjoy the advantages of 
decentralized government. 55 If a place like Watts were to become a 
separate local government rather than a place name for an area of the 
larger city~ the Serrano principle would require adequate funding. 
The quality of services could not be dependent on the wealth of the 
community. 
Egualized state general revenue sharing will be stimulated. The 
Serrano principle is that the quality of services cannot be dependent 
on the wealth of the area. The principle calls for some centralized 
public finance by the state to make up for local tax wealth inequities. 
If centralized control flowed from centralized finance, the court would 
likely have been persuaded that there was a compelling state interest 
in continuing the present inequitable system of school finance. Instead, 
the Serrano court specifically rejected the argument that centralized 
finance means loss of local control. As a result, formulas for increas-
ing state aid to the schools in response to Serrano are likely to be 
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general-purpose, no "strings, 11 rather than special-purpose, with 
"strings," grants. That will be no revolution, for in 1966-67, 84.7 
percent56 of state grants to school districts were for general purposes--
general revenue sharing. 
Serrano also requires equalization of aid. Obviously, if the 
state replaces local wealth with state wealth in a way which leaves 
school districts with current disparities in expenditures, the Serrano 
principle would not be met. Here again 9 state grants to schools 
have accepted the principle of equalization. In 1966-67, 69.2 percent 57 
of state grants to schools used some type of equalizing factor. Their 
inadequacy under Serrano is that they were not equalizing enough. 
But if the Serrano principle is extended to other public services, 
the change would be of near-revolutionary dimensions. First, state aid 
for non-educational functions is only 38 percent of total state aid. 58 
Second, local governments other than schools rely much more on their own 
sources, 59 disparities in wealth are as great or greater,60 so expendi-
61 ture levels are more unequal. Third, the aid that is available is 
hardly ever paid under ru1 equalization formula. 62 Richer communities 
may well tend to get richer as a result of state aid. 63 Finally, much 
more of the aid is categorical (special purpose). Thus, vThile most 
school aid can be used for any purpose by the school district (assuming 
certain state minimums are met), general-purpose local governments 
(cities and counties) receive aid for such special functions as welfare, 
health and highways. High1-ray aid cannot be used to provide fire pro-
tection, for example, though both are provided by the same general-
purpose government. No "strings" general aid to general-purpose local 
governments is a very small portion of local general revenue--some 2.7 
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percent in 1967. 64 Thus, after full application of the Serrano 
principle, the system of aid to general-purpose local governments 
will likely be shifted from one of relatively small amounts of aid, 
unequalized and categorical, to much more significant amounts of aid, 
equalized and general. The change would be in the same direction as but 
be far more radical than Serrano-caused responses in educational 
finance and would tend to create a state system of equalized general 
revenue sharing. 
The responsibility for funding tax exemptions will be shifted to 
the state. One of the reasons that tax base is unequally distributed 
is that tax exemptions are unequally distributed. The matter is most 
clearly evidenced by property tax exemptions. Suppose city A is a 
governmental, church, medical, cultural and educational center with 
much tax exempt property. The total market value of all of its real 
property is $5 billion. City B also has real property with a $5 billion 
real property valuation, but it is an industrial center. Because of 
exemptions, the taxable wealth of City A might be $2.5 billion. 65 The 
service demands on City A might ,.,ell be equivalent to those in City B. 
So if the property tax were the sole source of revenue in both cities, 
the tax rate in City A would be twice that in City B. The Serrano 
principle does not allow such a disparity. 
Presently, the problem of tax exemption is largely a local one. 
The state legislatures,disinclined to provide direct subsidies, provide 
indirect subsidies through tax exemption. Sometimes, though seldom, 
th t t . d . 1 . .. 66 G 1 1 1 . t f e s a e provl es ln- leu revenues. eneral y, oca unl s o 
government have only two possibilities with respect to tax exempt 
property: 1. increase rates on remaining taxable properties, or 
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2. exclude tax exempt uses. The latter response may be possible as to 
new tax exempt property; 67 it would be most difficult with respect to 
property already located within the city. 
Post Serrano~ however, tax exempt property must be treated as if 
it is not there when the contribution from non-local sources is com-
puted, so as to equalize tax burdens. It will no longer matter as much to 
localities whether property is tax exempt. While it still must be 
serviced, the servicing costs may well be no different than for other 
kinds of property. It will matter to the state, for every exemption 
granted will disproportionately lower local tax base, which must then 
be equalized by some centralized funding. 
The problem of providing funds to impacted areas will be shifted 
to the states. While Alfred Balk does not analyze the data in his 
68 book, he has fortunately included appendices containing the results 
of his survey of university payments to local governments, federal 
payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) statutes and programs, and PILT pro-
6o 
grams of states to capital cities of each state. ~ A fair summary of 
the appendices is that many universities make some payments to local 
government in their area,70 there are many federal PILT statutes which 
authorize payments to states and localities and few states make any in-
lieu payments to their capital cities because of tax exempt state property 
in the capital. 
Post Serrano the following changes might occur: 
1. Since universities are no longer impacting local governments71 
but are only impacting the state, universities will resist making pay-
ments to localities. Since almost all universities serve at least the 
region and any impact is widely distributed, there is little compelling 
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about an argument, made with respect to university towns, that uni-
versities in fairness should mru~e in-lieu payments to the state. 
2. Since federal installations, public lands, public housing and 
the like will no longer be impacting local governments, payments should 
be made to the governments impacted, namely the states, or alterna-
tively, to the extent federal property is reasonably evenly distributed 
throughout the states, no particular state is impacted and federal pay-
ments should be ended. 
3. In effect, states will have to equalize the tax burdens in 
capital city areas, as with other areas, so in effect, the state will 
be paying in-lieu taxes to capital cities. 
V. Conclusion 
The speculations in this article concerning the impact of the 
Serrano principle on city planning, land values and use, it may confi-
dently be predicted, do not constitute an exhaustive list. Some of the 
speculations may be wrong, but surely the status quo will be altered in 
the ways outlined or in other significant ways by application of the 
Serrano principle. At this time it is impossible to predict the full 
development of the Serrano principle. It may well be extended to other 
local governments than school districts, to all types of locally raised 
revenues and to equality measured by need rather than equal dollar 
expenditures. To the extent it is so extended, the radical alteration 
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